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The problem in which some agents joint together to realize a set of projects and must decide
how to share its cost may be seen as a cooperative cost game. In many instances, total
cost may naturally be decomposed into joint costs and costs that are speciﬁc to individual
agents. We show that the maximal amount that can be attributed directly to each agent
while yielding a problem for the joint cost that remains a cost game, is given by the minimal
incremental cost of adding this agent to any of the possible coalitions of other agents. Thus,
for concave games, it is given by the incremental cost of adding the agent to all others. We
also show that a concave game yields a reduced game that is itself concave.
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Résumé
Le problème où plusieurs agents entreprennent en commun un ensemble de projets et
doivent décider du partage du coût total peut être vu comme un jeu coopératif. Dans certains
cas, le coût total peut naturellement être décomposé en coûts joints et coûts spéciﬁques aux
agents. On montre que le montant maximal qui peut être attribué directement à chaque
agent, tout en donnant un problème de partage de coût joint qui constitue encore un jeu
de coût, est donné par le minimum des coûts incrémentaux de l’adjonction de l’agent aux
coalitions possibles des autres agents.1 Introduction
The problem in which some agents joint together to realize a set of projects and must
decide how to share its cost may be seen as a cooperative cost game, provided that the cost
function satisﬁes certain properties.1 Then, solution concepts from the theory of cooperative
games may be applied to these problems. In many instances, total cost may naturally be
decomposed into joint costs and costs that are speciﬁc to individual agents. When this is
the case, a desirable property of a solution concept or cost sharing rule is that it be invariant
to such a decomposition. More precisely, it must give the same cost shares whether the
rule is applied to total costs or to joint costs alone, the share of which are then added to
the speciﬁc costs of agents. The core, the Shapley value, and the nucleolus are examples of
solution concepts that are invariant to such a decomposition, provided that the remaining
joint costs problem still deﬁnes a cost game. The serial cost sharing rule, which is of a
diﬀerent variety, is also invariant to such a decomposition in the context of a single private
homogenous good.
Given a solution concept invariant to decomposition, it may be desirable to reduce the
problem to its essential part, the one that cannot be attributed directly to the agents as being
speciﬁc. As noted by Young (1994, p.1203), “Sometimes the distinction between direct and
joint costs is not so clear, however.” Our purpose in this note is simply to characterize the
maximal amounts of total cost that can be formally declared as being speciﬁc to the diﬀerent
agents, while giving a problem for the joint costs that remains a cost game. We show that
the maximal amount that can be attributed directly to each agent is given by the minimal
incremental cost of adding this agent to any of the possible coalitions of other agents. Thus,
for concave games, it is given by the incremental cost of adding the agent to all others. We
also show that a concave game yields a reduced game that is itself concave.
1See Young (1994) for an excellent survey on this approach.2D e ﬁnitions and preliminary results
Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of agents and N be the family of all subsets or coalitions of
N including N and ∅. Given i ∈ N, let N−i = {S ∈ N : i/ ∈ S}.
Deﬁnition 1 A cost game is a pair (c,N) where c : N → R+ is a mapping satisfying
c(∅)=0and the following conditions:
∀S,T ∈ N : S ⊂ T ⇒ c(S) ≤ c(T) (Monotonicity)
∀S,T ∈ N : c(S ∪ T) ≤ c(S)+c(T) (Sub-additivity)
Remark 1 Monotonicity can be deﬁned equivalently by:
∀i ∈ N : ∀S ∈ N−i : c(S) ≤ c(S ∪ {i})




c({i}) (Non-negative gain from cooperation)
Deﬁnition 2 Given a cost game (c,N) and a vector d ∈ Rn
+, let ˆ cd : N → R+ be a mapping
deﬁned by:




with the convention that
P
i∈S di =0if S = ∅. Then, (d,ˆ cd) is a decomposition of (c,N) if
(ˆ cd,N) is itself a game, i.e. if ˆ cd is sub-additive and monotonic.
T h en e x tl e m m as h o w st h a ti ti ss u ﬃcient to check for the monotonicity of ˆ cd to make
sure that (ˆ cd,N) is a game.
Lemma 1 Given a decomposition (d,ˆ cd) of a game (c,N), then (ˆ cd,N) is a game if ˆ cd is
monotonic.
2Proof. Consider a game (c,N) and a decomposition (d,ˆ cd) such that ˆ cd is monotonic.
Then,














=ˆ cd (S)+ˆ cd (T\S) ≤ ˆ cd (S)+ˆ cd (T)
where the ﬁrst inequality results from the sub-additivity of c and the last one from the
monotonicity of ˆ cd. Thus ˆ cd is sub-additive.
3 Maximal decompositions
Given a decomposition (d,ˆ cd) of a game, d is usually seen as a vector of speciﬁcc o s t sw h i l e
ˆ cd (N) is the joint or common cost. Except in trivial cases, it can be diﬃcult to tell which
costs are speciﬁc and which ones are common. The question addressed here is what are
the maximal values that the components of d can take while respecting the constraint that
(ˆ cd,N) be a game, i.e. that ˆ cd be monotonic.
Deﬁnition 3 A maximal decomposition of (c,N) is a decomposition (d+,ˆ cd+) such that for
any other decomposition (d,ˆ cd):
∃i ∈ N : di >d
+
i ⇒∃ j ∈ N : dj <d
+
j
Deﬁnition 4 A maximal decomposition of (c,N) for agent i is a decomposition (di,ˆ cdi)
such that for any other decomposition (d,ˆ cd):di ≤ di
i.
Lemma 2 (di,ˆ cdi) is a maximal decomposition of (c,N) for agent i if and only if:
di
i =m i n
S∈N−i
c(S ∪ {i}) − c(S)
0 ≤ di
j ≤ c(S ∪ {j}) − c(S) ∀S ∈ N−j, ∀j 6= i
(1)
3Proof. B yL e m m a1a n dR e m a r k1 ,f o r(di,ˆ cdi) to be a decomposition of (c,N), it is
necessary and suﬃcient that, for any j ∈ N and any S ∈ N−j :
ˆ cdi (S ∪ {j}) − ˆ cdi (S)=c(S ∪ {j}) − c(S) − d
i
j ≥ 0
This is precisely what the constraints require for all agents other than i.A s f o r di
i, it is
deﬁned as the maximal value compatible with these constraints for agent i.
From the above lemma, we can guess immediately the content of the main proposition.
Proposition 1 Any cost game (c,N) has a unique maximal decomposition (d+,ˆ cd+) where:
∀i ∈ N : d
+
i =m i n
S∈N−i
c(S ∪ {i}) − c(S).
Proof. It suﬃces to note that d+ is a solution of (1), i.e. (d+,ˆ cd+) is a maximal
decomposition for any i.
We can say more of concave games.
Deﬁnition 5 Ac o s tf u n c t i o nc : N → R+ is concave if:
∀i ∈ N,∀S,T ∈ N−i : S ⊂ T ⇒ c(S ∪ {i}) − c(S) ≥ c(T ∪ {i}) − c(T)
An equivalent deﬁnition is:
∀S,T ∈ N : c(S)+c(T) ≥ c(S ∪ T)+c(S ∩ T)
A concave cost function also satisﬁes sub-additivity and non-negative gain from cooperation.
It thus deﬁnes a cost game, which is said concave.
Proposition 2 A decomposition (d,ˆ cd) of a concave game (c,N) yields a reduced game
(ˆ cd,N) that is concave. In particular, the maximal decomposition of a concave game yields
a concave game.
4Proof. Consider a concave game (c,N) and a decomposition (d,ˆ cd). Since ˆ cd is monotonic,
then:



























=ˆ cd (S ∪ T)+ˆ cd (S ∩ T)
Thus, ˆ cd is concave.
Remark 3 Clearly, the maximal decomposition (d+,ˆ cd+) of a concave game is given by
d
+
i = c(N) − c(N\{i}) ∀i.
Remark 4 The results of this note can be extended to games where sub-additivity and
concavity are replaced by super-additivity and convexity respectively. Then, the maximal
decomposition of a convex game is given by d
+
i = c({i}) ∀i.
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